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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

COMMUNICATION AND AGREEMENT

ON a previous occasion [1] I sketched briefly some aspects of that process of communication with the universe which John Grote held to be a basic feature of experience, pointing out the contrast between the relatively large measure of agreement which has been reached about many physical features and the emphatic disagreement about many features of human thought and action. The world of "abbreviations and summarizations by the help of language," as Grote puts it, which multiplies our communication in a way otherwise impossible, is also a world of misunderstandings and cross-purposes, from which we try to extract agreement by logical effort and linguistic accuracy. To examine the reasons for this across the whole realm of human affairs would clearly be impossible except on a large scale; but something can be done in a moderate compass by reviewing certain disputed points which arise at the boundaries of philosophical and scientific discussion.

Language, it is clear, stands as the primary requisite for the growth and interplay of human experience as we know it. Mrs. de Laguna has well stated its case: "The essential constitutive relations of the things we cognize in the world, and the acts we perform to, or with, or on them, are reflected in the structure of language. But while the basic structure of language is ultimately determined by the interrelations of things and human acts, it develops an organic structure peculiarly its own, relatively independent and autonomous." [2] It is equally clear, however, that what any human being uses is not language in general, but a language in particular; and the extent to which a given language effects this adjustment to experience and this autonomous existence is decided, more or less successfully, by each language for itself. Each has its own more or less developed individuality, its own range of capacity and expressiveness, deriving in part from the richness of the experience which it embodies, in part from conscious improvement over the period which its life covers. We can say with consider-

[1] "Communication," this JOURNAL, Vol. XLIII (1946), pp. 266–274. As contrasted with the present discussion, it might have been called "Communication and Informing."

[2] Grace de Laguna, *Speech: Its Function and Development* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1927), p. 306.

able truth that each language both is and reflects a world of its own.

This state of affairs produces two significant results. In the first place, each user of such a language tends to think of its traits as the self-sufficient work of nature, which it is very hard to view objectively, so that traits which are the outcome of particular circumstances may be given an undeserved importance. There is no reason to suppose that every language passes through a fixed series of stages; indeed, we know that certain features are lost, and certain others retained in an almost fossilized state, in any language according to the influences of its history. Any language works out its own relations to experience, and the solutions it achieves are mainly worked out within its own field. Hence, in the second place, it is difficult to enter fully into all this in a language not our own; to do it with languages of several families is perhaps impossible, and is certainly of rare occurrence. We must not confuse linguistic acquaintance with linguistic intimacy, or ignore the enormous gaps between the entire body of languages and the few which may come in our way.

We need not, therefore, be surprised to find that any language meets a number of varying needs, or that it meets them with varying success. What we may want to designate and to communicate is the basic question to which the various devices of language are more or less adequate answers. There never was an age in which language was the effortless and transparent rendering of every aspect of experience, nor will mere taking of thought ever make it so. Whatever view of its origins we may entertain, we must agree that they were primarily responses to the conditions of existence, identifying necessary objects and reactions, and only gradually extending to remoter and more problematical aspects.[3] If the vocabularies of so-called primitive peoples are exceedingly rich in concrete terms for objects with which they are immediately concerned, and lacking in general terms for which they have little use, that is not to be counted against them. It is not an unmixed blessing that what we call the growth of civilization means in so many directions a fondness for generality which may end in vagueness and lack of grip on fundamental meanings.

All this means, quite simply, that logical relations took shape and were later studied in a linguistic environment which had already long existed, and which continued its activity in whatever direction its users saw fit. Hence these relations had to be extricated and expounded in the very language which they later seemed

[3] See Justus Meyer, "Language as a Biological Phenomenon," this JOURNAL, Vol. XLVI (1949), pp. 386–393, for a sensible treatment of the matter.

designed to rectify, and it is not strange that confusions arose in the process. Those for whom logic has become a primary concern are prone to argue that all languages are defective, and should even be abandoned in favor of some supposedly better means of communication. This, however, is much like arguing that because certain features of our physical make-up get out of order, we should be better off without them; or, in a different field, that a proper analysis of the atmosphere should only be carried out in the absence of air. Whether we like it or not, we are surrounded by the words of our mother tongue all the days of our life, and we can not frame an effective indictment of it except by using the words which it supplies. The full weight of this fact will become apparent at a later stage of our discussion.

A language, to be readily studied, needs to be reduced to written form, which means, to our modern requirements, the use of an alphabet. Now the alphabet is perhaps the most pragmatic of human inventions; provided a system works fairly well, it seems that only incidental efforts to improve it are likely to be made. The Arabic alphabet is not, to our western taste, very convenient, but it has been widely diffused and adopted by many languages. As for the Roman alphabet, it has spread in all directions, but with many individual adaptations, particularly for the sounds which we denote in English by "ch" and "sh." The most recent detailed discussion of the whole subject concludes that no universal solution is attainable, and that pragmatic solutions are the best that can be expected.[4] It has to be remembered that the business of an ordinary alphabet is to record the significant sounds of a given language, in a set of workable symbols, not to note all the niceties of pronunciation, and much less all the vocal noises which the organs of speech can produce. The activity of phoneticians is excellent, but its value for ordinary writing practice can easily be exaggerated.

All this serves to explain why attempts at purely phonetic spelling have never enjoyed more than a limited success. They are framed on too exclusively logical principles; they often neglect historical connections which it may be desirable to preserve; and, because of the limited number of possible sounds, they often introduce ambiguity in one place while trying to avoid it in another. Moreover, in the case of a language with a long and mixed ancestry like English, they neglect the influence of what Jespersen has called the desire to play with language. Almost all the "reformed" spellings have already been employed with humorous intent, so

[4] David Diringer, *The Alphabet* (1948); see esp. pp. 552–559.

that any attempt to marshal them is likely to look "funny" in both senses of the word. Also, since uniformity of pronunciation is almost never attained over a wide area, the attempt to fix it by the usage at one spot will produce more or less vigorous dissent, and any attempt to provide for all local differences would soon produce absurdity. Improvement in many respects is desirable, but it must probably come slowly, and not wholesale or by fiat.[5]

At the point we have now reached, any written record may be regarded as based on some system of notation. Letters, numerical symbols, ideograms, all reduce some aspect of experience to compact and manageable form; and the words or equations formed by them become fresh symbols, to be grouped as syntax or mathematical form may suggest. As in the case of the alphabet, it is well known that the adoption of mathematical symbols was slow and uncertain; the letters used by the Greeks and Romans, though never well suited to the purpose, persisted for centuries, and even after the acceptance of Arabic numerals the symbols for operations made their way into use slowly and haltingly. It would seem that willingness to put up with the shortcomings of a familiar system has always been a stronger force than the logical appeal of a proposed new form, and that the latter must approve itself, if at all, only after familiarity has made a basis for its acceptance. Pure logic, in other words, is not a compelling motive, but requires reinforcement.

The over-valuing of logic also throws a side-light on the failure of proposals for universal languages to make much headway, despite their alleged merits. Practically all such proposals emphasize the need for strictly logical principles in the construction of the new language, endeavoring to commend it by assigning to logic a place which no living language gives it. Moreover, the logical force of some of these proposed features is by no means great; they too often prove to be based on superficial analogies or to embody a purely mechanical consistency. Any living language is a going concern, supported by a considerable body of users within definite geographical limits; if we take a million users as a rough criterion of "considerable," we find a large number of languages qualifying under it. But the users of an artificial language do not occupy a specific territory, and are supported only by intellectual connections dispersed over many countries; nor have their defenders ever made it clear whether the proposed language is to function purely

[5] The proposal lately brought to notice by George Bernard Shaw's will has all the marks of mid-Victorian reform—the collection of doubtfully relevant statistics, the elimination of "phoneticians, etymologists, spelling reformers," the employment of a new and complicated alphabet of forty letters, considerably in excess of any practical needs.

as an auxiliary or whether it is intended to take its place as a competitor among existing languages.[6]

Much has been made in certain circles[7] of the growth of a technical vocabulary drawn from Greek and Latin sources, and internationally diffused by the progress of science. Such a vocabulary certainly exists; quite as certainly, it has grown up like any other technical vocabulary, without regard to logical preconceptions. Words that are needed have stayed, words that did not meet a need are dropped, just as happens with words in ordinary discourse. Further, while certain words pass unchanged into all or most languages, others are modified according to the practice of the language which they enter. But even if the technical vocabulary were everywhere uniform, it would still have to be used in conjunction with the regular words of any particular language, and these words would mostly remain just what they were, leaving the linguistic problem still with us. Moreover, the stability of the technical vocabulary varies greatly in different parts; some terms appear to be permanent acquisitions, others come in with new objects, and may pass out of use if the objects are no longer employed.

The aspect of linguistic growth which underlies logic has been well described[8] as the assigning of meaning in "a territory or area over which the various possibilities of correct application are mapped out." In some cases the object meant is so definite that a specific word can easily and permanently be associated with it; in others, especially with the development of more and more abstract conceptions, a term comes to cover a wide field, in which now one and now another aspect attracts attention, and disagreement arises over the relative importance to be attached to each. Such words as *laccolith* and *aril* are not likely to be misunderstood, because they have definite and limited applications, and are likely to be used only by those with some technical proficiency; but as we go on to more general terms the questions of definition and application become more pressing. One need only mention the debates on the nature of probability to show the amount of variation which may beset a widely employed but slippery concept. The possible meanings of such terms have to be discriminated and held to, if any consistently logical treatment of them is to be possible.

It is a curious fact that thinkers who profess a devotion to the

[6] I have discussed this question more fully in "The Problem of a Universal Language," *Scientific Monthly*, November, 1950, pp. 337–342.

[7] Notably by Professor Hogben, whose Interglossa seems one of the less promising entrants in international competition.

[8] Alan H. Gardiner, *The Theory of Speech and Language* (1932), p. 36.

principles of exact science are often casual in their handling of terms. When Hume, after offering several incompatible words to describe the feeling of assent, blandly declares, "Provided we agree about the thing, it is needless to dispute about the terms," are we to believe that he speaks in perfect innocence? When Eddington, after telling us that the whole subject-matter of exact science consists of pointer-readings and similar indications, declines to enter into the definition of "similar indications," can we feel that the demands of exact thought are being met? When Russell assures us that the words "physical" and "mental" serve no purpose, but that it is unobjectionable to say that physical is what is dealt with by physics and mental is what is dealt with by psychology, are we being offered clear-cut and intelligible ideas, or are we being entertained by an ingenious bit of verbal interchange which will not stand analysis? It is perhaps worth while to carry this line a little farther by considering Russell's definition of an "event."

An event, we are told, "is anything which, according to the old notions, would be said to have both a date and a place. An explosion, a flash of lightning, the starting of a light-wave from an atom, the arrival of the light-wave at some other body, would be an event." It is not a matter of indifference whether a date is fixed to the nearest month, or day, or hour, or minute, or second, according to the nature of the occurrence; but let that pass. What is more important is that an explosion or a flash of lightning may be decidedly complex, as exact science has proved many lightning flashes to be; lumping all cases of them as events does not add to our knowledge of their nature. But the matter is further complicated when we are told later that "seeing a flash of lightning is an event, so is hearing a tire burst, or smelling a rotten egg, or feeling the coldness of a frog." Here again the perception may be the end-result of a long train of chemical occurrences and neural processes, of which the perceptual event is only a part; nor would everyone agree that such seemingly disparate matters as an explosion and the cold feel of a frog are made more understandable or more manageable by calling them events; the term is too elastic for comfort.[9]

Yet these eccentricities come from a writer who has been second to none in proclaiming the shortcomings of ordinary language and the perils of our adherence to it. "This does not mean," he declares, "that we ought, in our attempts at serious thinking, to be content with ordinary language, with its ambiguities and its abomi-

[9] See Bertrand Russell, *Philosophy* (New York, W. W. Norton, 1927), pp. 142, 110, 276.

nable syntax. I remain convinced that obstinate addiction to ordinary language in our private thoughts is one of the main obstacles to progress in philosophy. Many current theories would not bear translation into *any* exact language."[10] This certainly suggests that a choice of such languages actually exists, from which a selection might be made by anyone desiring to escape the defects of his native tongue. But what are these languages, and where can they be found? Not, presumably, among any languages currently in use; for, as we have seen, conscious logic arises within language, and no language has ever grown to maturity by observing strictly logical principles. The only alternative appears to be some system or calculus of purely logical symbols; and the question at once arises, is such a calculus a language in any proper sense, and can "translation" into it really be effected?

In ordinary usage, the term "translation" means that a text existing as a selection of words in a given language is to be equated with a corresponding set of words in a different language. It is not normally expected that the result will be an improvement or a clarification of the original; the aim is rather to convey the meaning as fully as possible from one language to the other. A purely factual text may go over pretty directly, an idiomatic one less so. Even in kindred languages idioms may differ; much more will they do so in languages only distantly related; but in individual details any two languages may coincide to an unexpected degree, and produce felicitous transfers of meaning in special cases. Such niceties of esthetic expression, however, can not be counted on; what we do expect is the adequate transfer of a common meaning from one language to as many others as may come into consideration. It is common knowledge that translations vary in excellence, and that the longer the text, the greater the scope for varying opinions as to their success. On a small scale, we may note that the proverbs of many languages are found to express the same basic idea in different imagery; one is not the translation of another, but is its equivalent, and a merely literal translation may miss the point altogether.

It is clear that a genuine language is something much wider than the system of formation and transformation rules to which the logical analysts would reduce it. What can really be done is to set up a scheme for converting one set of symbols into another, as with the currencies of different countries; and just as the values of currencies change, so may the relations of any one scheme of

[10] *The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell*, The Library of Living Philosophers, Vol. V (Evanston and Chicago, Northwestern University, 1944), p. 694.

symbols to another require restatement. But what the logical analysts seem to have in mind is a process by which the restatement shall automatically discard what they take to be the errors of the initial formulation, without considering closely whether the supposed errors really are such. A supposed translation of a document which omitted large portions because they were opposed to the translator's opinions would not, in ordinary usage, be called a translation at all; but just that is what the discoverers of alleged "pseudo-problems" appear to be doing. It would seem to be safer to keep the customary meaning of "translation," and to use some such term as "conversion" for the interchange of symbols.[11]

The full irony of the situation is that a logical calculus can be neither explained nor defended except through the ordinary language which it seeks to replace. When Russell expounds the defects of the latter, it is with its own words, not with the symbols of a proposed logic as yet unknown to those whose conversion is sought. If ordinary language is in truth so defective, it is strange that Russell has piled up such a body of books and articles in it. I venture to doubt if the private thoughts of any logician have ever been exclusively couched in logical symbols; certainly his public thoughts can not be, if he expects them to gain attention. The master-economist, says John M. Keynes, must understand symbols and speak in words; but so must every user of symbols, master or not. To take the most obvious case, we use number-words as well as number-symbols; and while it is true that after a foundation has been established a discussion among those who understand it can be carried on almost wholly in symbolic terms, they must return to words when a difficulty requires to be explained. All symbolic devices exist within the world of linguistic experience, not above it or beyond it.[12]

There is no reason to suppose that the average philosopher is a closer student of language than anyone else, or that he goes beyond the usual level of linguistic experience unless he has made a special effort to do so. A few years ago two British writers published a study [13] which deserves the careful attention of all workers in this field. They point out that few philosophers are trained linguists;

[11] On this whole matter, see C. J. Ducasse, "Concerning the Status of So-called 'Pseudo-Object' Sentences," this JOURNAL, Vol. XXXVII (1940), pp. 309–324.

[12] "It is this constant interplay between language and experience which removes language from the cold status of such merely and simply symbolic systems as mathematical symbols or flag signalling."—Edward Sapir, in *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, IX, p. 157.

[13] A. H. Basson and D. J. O'Connor, "Language and Philosophy: Some Suggestions for an Empirical Approach," *Philosophy*, Vol. XXII (1947), pp. 49–65.

that no attempt has been made to verify the alleged determination of philosophy by linguistic structure; that even a comparison of translations of philosophical works to see whether peculiarities of language and syntax have affected the expression of thought has never been attempted. The construction of artificial languages which can express everything except philosophy has not been fruitful, since they prove inadequate as means of expression, and fail to realize that language must be capable of expressing anything, including incompatible propositions of every sort, logical as well as factual. To repeat James Ward's dictum, we may ignore, but we can not exclude; and once we have decided not to ignore, we must give each item a fair chance to make good whatever claim it may present.

A final obstacle which excess of logic has placed in the path of agreement is the tendency to describe features of the physical world as "logical constructs," valid only as a provisional means of coordinating sense impressions. The development of experimental physics seems to have placed a barrier in the way of thus considering things, but some philosophers are still fond of it, as are some popularizers. To say that the electron, for instance, is "inaccessible to observation" is a matter of definition; it is in any case to overlook the extent to which the experience of any one of us depends on unobserved and inferred factors, many of which will never be observed directly. The mere fact that such elements can be considered in a logical light does not mean that they are constructed solely by logic. When I stand before a door that is equipped with a mechanism actuated by a photo-electric cell, and the door opens, something has happened which is more than the play of logical constructions or mathematical formulas. When a physicist examines the structure of a substance by spectroscopic or X-ray analysis, it seems rather absurd to say that he knows nothing of the tools he works with. He does not yet know everything; but to the ordinary observer he seems to know a good deal.

We may conclude, then, that agreement in discussion will not be promoted by trying to assign to pure logic a position which it can not really maintain, or thinking that language, despite its admitted shortcomings, can be supplanted by purely logical devices. We certainly need the sharpest possible sense of the meaning of terms, the clearest possible view of the implications of statements; but we shall probably not get them, even for ourselves, by the mere manipulation of symbols, and we shall certainly not be able to convey them to others without a large use of ordinary language, made as accurate and flexible as our abilities permit. Both scientific and philosoph-

ical writing offer abundant scope for the development of sensitiveness in these matters, and for considering how individual doctrines and insights enter into the growth of experience as a whole—so far as it is a whole. The last word rests again with John Grote: intelligence is really co-intelligence, communicable as well as self-satisfying.

CHARLES E. WHITMORE

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A NOTE ON PROFESSOR PEPPER'S AESTHETIC OBJECT

"THERE has been," Professor Pepper finds, "a strange neglect of the nature of the work of art"[1]: strange, one gathers, because in truth "an aesthetic work of art is a very peculiar sort of object"[2] and because, moreover, "the peculiarities of aesthetic judgment, and the uncertainty on the part of many critics as to just what they are judging, all derive from the peculiarity of this practical object of aesthetic criticism and appreciation."[3] To his admirable Harvard and California lectures on the basis of criticism in the arts Professor Pepper accordingly appended, when he published them, a Supplementary Essay on The Aesthetic Work of Art[4] in which he sought to say, more narrowly and adequately than he had found it possible to say in the course of his lectures, what such a Work is.

Professor Pepper's Essay has not, so far as my knowledge runs, been much discussed, although the book in which it appears has of course been widely reviewed and is now often referred to. Nevertheless it is clear that if in the book the essay follows upon the lectures, in respect of doctrine the lectures follow or should follow from the essay, that is to say from the conception of the aesthetic object therein proposed. It is the supplementary essay which is fundamental: it tells or means to tell us *what* Professor Pepper has all this while been talking about.[5] How if it turn out that what he has been talking about perhaps does not exist at all, perhaps can not exist, the description given of it being self-contradictory? One of two things will then be true: either that the lectures fail because

[1] Pepper, Stephen C.: *The Basis of Criticism in the Arts* (Harvard University Press, 1946), p. 143. All further references are to this book.

[2] P. 143.

[3] P. 149.

[4] Pp. 142–171.

[5] That this is the relation between essay and lectures Professor Pepper points out in his Preface, p. vii.

the conception upon which they rest—the conception of the subject-matter of criticism—is inadmissible; or that the lectures stand and are still illuminating, because Professor Pepper has after all not been talking about the aesthetic object as he formally defines it. I think that the lectures stand and are illuminating, very. I think also that Professor Pepper's description of the aesthetic object is self-contradictory; and I will try to show how this is so.

We may begin with a terminological remark. Professor Pepper speaks, we have seen, of the neglect of the nature of *the work of art;* tells us, too, that "*the work of art* was the object on which the whole series [of his lectures] was focused."[6] But it is *an aesthetic work of art* that is said to be a very peculiar sort of object; and the essay in which this is said is an essay on *the aesthetic work of art.* Are these phrases equivalent and interchangeable? Clearly they are not. The phrase "the aesthetic work of art" seems rather odd, at first glance, seems redundant. But it is not. Far from being redundant, it signalizes a radical (indeed, the radical) distinction Professor Pepper is intent upon establishing. The work of art is a physical object.[7] The aesthetic work of art is not. This is to be remembered, even in the face of Professor Pepper himself, who (we must be allowed to observe) moves very casually from one to the other of these two phrases, for all that his analysis shows that they signify, for him, quite distinct things. The aesthetic work of art is not a physical object, but something else. What that is we shall do well to have Professor Pepper explain in his own way:

> . . . let us take . . . the El Greco "Toledo." Now what is the aesthetic object here which is the focus of aesthetic judgment and criticism? There is the physical canvas and pigment, which El Greco worked upon, which has passed through various hands, and which now hangs on a wall of the New York Metropolitan Art Museum. There is next the subject who comes in and looks at it—you or me. Lastly there is the perception of the picture that comes to the subject whenever he looks at it.[8] . . . Now, a perception occurs only when a subject and an object get into some sort of touch with each other.[9] . . . We see the picture, and what we see is the result of ourselves and the physical picture somehow getting together.[10] . . . The repeatedly perceived picture, however, it should be noticed, is not a continuant. The perceived picture consists of a succession of intermittent perceptions—at least as far as we gather from any ordinary direct evidence concerning the situation. And what is particularly striking about this situation is that it is the *perceived picture,* not the continuous physical picture nor the continuous self who looks at it, that is the object

[6] P. vii (my italics).
[7] P. 18.
[8] P. 143.
[9] P. 145.
[10] P. 145.

appreciated, and, if so be, critically judged. *The central aesthetic object turns out to be an intermittent object made up of fugitive perceptions.*[11]

That in considering the aesthetic object we have always to do with a succession of perceptions Professor Pepper tells us often, and we may follow him in emphasizing this, for it is at this point that perplexity arises. If there be any doubt about his meaning, it must vanish in the presence of the following sentences:

The object of aesthetic judgment and appreciation in a work of art, then, is not this, that, or the other perception as it comes, but rather the total series, P_1-P_2-P_3-P_4, which we shall call the *perceptive series*. This is literally the aesthetic work of art.[12]

The criticism I have to offer of this conception of the aesthetic work of art as literally a series of perceptions may be briefly put. That there is such a thing as the perceptive series of which Professor Pepper speaks is true enough, and Professor Pepper is free to say that by the aesthetic work of art he is going to mean that series. But there is something else that Professor Pepper says, and says repeatedly, about the aesthetic work of art. *He says that it is always a perceived object.*[13] The motive for saying this or something like this we understand. There is doubtless a distinction somehow to be drawn between the thing hanging, merely hanging, on the museum wall and that thing as object of aesthetic judgment. Uncontemplated, unperceived, that thing will hardly be what men talk about with so much animation. But I can not think that Professor Pepper has successfully formulated the felt distinction. For I ask: can a *series* of perceptions be perceived? This is impossible. Professor Pepper may say if he likes that the aesthetic work of art is a series of perceptions. He may say that the aesthetic work of art is always a perceived object. He can not (intelligibly) say both.

The conclusion to which Professor Pepper's analysis ought properly to lead him is very different from the proposition which in fact he sets before us. The aesthetic work of art, in Professor Pepper's analysis, far from being always a perceived object, is *never* a perceived object. It is conceived, and only conceived. This much is clear when we reflect upon what it must be to apprehend a series of perceptions. And how remote Professor Pepper is in fact from defining an aesthetic object which is always a perceived object becomes still clearer when we observe what he is driven to say when he confronts, as inevitably he must, a certain ancient difficulty which arises anew out of his analysis:

[11] Pp. 145–146 (my italics).
[12] P. 149.
[13] P. 147.

> The presence of a multiplicity of subjects before a work of art suggests the possibility of a great relativity of perception. If a hundred different subjects look at El Greco's "Toledo" will there not be a hundred different subjective contributions to the perceived object, and so a hundred different perceptions, and so again a hundred different aesthetic objects? Is El Greco's "Toledo" in any legitimate sense a single aesthetic work of art to so many subjects, or is it not as numerous as the subjects that see it? We are faced again with the question of the objectivity of the work of art.[14]

How does Professor Pepper meet this old and uncomfortable question? He meets it, I find, by abandoning the definition of the aesthetic work of art thus far maintained in his essay. The aesthetic work of art ceases to be the perceptive series, the total series of perceptions, of any one man: the impossibility of defining the Work in this way, if there is to be *one* "Toledo" or whatever, has suddenly become too clear to be overlooked. Accordingly Professor Pepper proposes now to say this:

> Due to similar biological constitution, and a common culture when participated in, and the funding of the earlier perceptions with the later in the perceptive series, there is altogether what may be called a convergence effect towards a pretty high degree of identity in the total perceptive series of different subjects—*that is, in the aesthetic work of art. The aesthetic work of art is, in fact, the common object of these subjects.* It is that which the constancy of the physical continuant, the common biological constitution of the subjects, a culture common to these subjects, and the fully rounded experience which we call the total perceptive series of these subjects brings into being.[15]

And with this we have not one but two new definitions of the aesthetic work of art. The work is no longer the total perceptive series of a single subject. It is now, for one thing, the total perceptive series of different subjects; it is the set or collection of indefinitely many perceptive series, as many as there are subjects, or have been, or ever will be. But it is also, in the next breath or sentence, the common object of these subjects. What can that thing be, which is at once a set of series of perceptions and the common object of a set of percipients? The common object can hardly be the set of series of perceptions. But I will not dwell upon this. What I would emphasize is this rather: the set of series of perceptions cannot be perceived, and cannot therefore be the aesthetic work of art, if it is to be maintained that the aesthetic work of art is always a perceived object. Once again we have before us an ideal or conceived object, not a perceived. And "the common object of these subjects" cannot be a perceived object either, if we remember that this common object is what the several perceptive series *converge toward.* We have here the conception of a limit,

[14] P. 166.

[15] P. 167 (italics mine).

indefinitely approachable, not attained, not perhaps attainable. The "common object of these subjects" is not a common object of perception; it is at best a common goal, or common term of imaginative and intellectual endeavor. And, be it finally noted, were the goal or limit attained, were all men somehow to come at last to perceive the "Toledo" or whatever in quite the same way, what then they would perceive would hardly be a series of perceptions. I can not resist repeating this.

In sum, we emerge from Professor Pepper's analysis of the *aesthetic* work of art with a set of incompatible propositions. Let us write the propositions down seriatim:

1. The aesthetic work of art is always a perceived object.
2. The aesthetic work of art is the total perceptive series of a single subject.
3. The aesthetic work of art is the set of the total perceptive series of indefinitely many subjects.
4. The aesthetic work of art is the common object of the many subjects, in this sense, that it is that upon or toward which the many perceptive series of the many subjects converge.

Take any one of these propositions to be true: then all the rest are false.

NATHAN BERALL

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COMMENTS AND CRITICISM

TRUTH OR MEANING?

May a student and teacher of law and political science, but not of philosophy, horn in for some comments on Professor Montague's criticism of logical positivism?

The logical positivist does indeed emphasize the necessity of meaning in propositions he is invited to support or reject before considering the truth or falsity of such propositions. But times and ideas evolve, or change, and semantics, we should remember, is a new science or quasi-science. The positivist of today seems to me to be fully justified in seeking to ascertain just *what* he is asked to affirm or deny.

Let us take Professor Montague's own illustration. He writes: ". . . it is, for example, all right to reject as false a belief in God. But if this rejection is honestly held, why in God's name should one not say just that?"[1] The answer is very simple. We are entitled

[1] W. P. Montague, "The Modern Distemper of Philosophy," this JOURNAL, Vol. XLVIII (July 5, 1951). The quotation is from page 434.

to ask the believer in God just what the term means to *him*. For ideas and definitions of this term vary. God, says Professor Ames of Chicago University, exists in the sense that Uncle Sam or John Bull exists. God, says another believer, is a name for all the good forces in the cosmos. Still another believer says that God is a super-person. But the Anglican Church takes the radical position that God has a no body and no parts, and is Pure Being—and what does that mean?

As a logical positivist, I am justified, to repeat, in asking any interlocutor to tell me what he means by the term in question. Else, what am I to affirm or deny? Precise thinking is not a fault but a virtue, and semantics properly understood has done much, and will do more, to improve our thinking. Heaven knows, philosophy and metaphysics badly need the aid of semantics and of logic. What men have fought and died for in the past is not relevant to our situation. Heresies in religion or theology have sent men to the stake, and criminal heresies of the past are accepted truths today.

Traditions are not eternal. They undergo modifications or suffer complete repudiation in the light of science and philosophy.

VICTOR S. YARROS

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COMMUNICATIONS

PRIVACY OF OPINION

How valid is the cry, "No one has a right to invade my privacy of opinion or belief"? But, first, what does the statement mean? Does it mean that no one whom I disagree with and who wishes to or has the power to persecute me has the right to invade the privacy of my opinion? I think that this is what is really meant. Suppose someone disagrees with me but has no wish to persecute me for the disagreement, would I refrain from sharing with him my belief? I think not. Suppose someone disagrees with me but has not the power to persecute me for the disagreement, would I refrain from revealing to him my belief? I think not. I refuse to share with or reveal to a person my belief only when he has the wish and the power to persecute me for it. In this case I want to enjoy the right of privacy of opinion. But what this further means is that the person who wishes and has the power to persecute me for my difference with him also has the wish and the power to persecute me not alone for my difference but for my refusal to share it with or reveal it to him. That is, I want to enjoy the right of difference of opinion without persecution and the right to keep it private without

persecution. When I refuse to share with or reveal to a person my belief, I want to do so as an enjoyment of two rights—the right of difference without persecution and the right of privacy without persecution. But when do we cry for the right of privacy without persecution? Only when the right of privacy is met with persecution. If there is no threat or danger of persecution there is no cry for the right of privacy. In the matter of the right to difference of opinion, sometimes there is and sometimes there is not a danger of persecution. With the right of privacy there is always the danger or threat of persecution for the desire to enjoy it. If someone who has no power over me tries to enjoin upon me to share with him my opinion I may or may not yield. But if someone who has the power over me enjoins upon me to reveal to him my opinion I can enjoy the right of privacy only at the expense of persecution. I now suffer the consequences of a martyr, but I do enjoy the consequences of the right of privacy.

And—this is another question—what is this privacy that I suffer so much to enjoy? If my opinion were private in the sense that it remained only in my own head, would the persecutor wish to persecute me for it? Obviously not. The persecutor demands that I reveal to him my opinion because he knows that my opinion is dangerous to him and he knows that it is dangerous to him because he knows that I share my opinion with or might share my opinion with others who will combine against him; that is, he knows that there is no such thing as privacy of opinion. Suppose I were to say to the persecutor that my opinion is absolutely so private and so interior to my own head that there is no possibility whatever of my opinion ever taking wings and that he therefore need have no fears. Would the persecutor believe me? Of course not, for the simple reason that every persecutor is a behaviorist and knows that all opinion is social in origin and effect. Every persecutor knows that we are all social-minded. Now, is there such a thing as an opinion that has complete privacy in the sense of absolute mental interiority? Who in his right senses would want such opinions? Do we not want to entertain an opinion for its social efficacy? Is not an opinion in actuality a social tie of the individual with society? If this be the reality of the nature of an opinion can there be any reality to the privacy of opinion? And if there be no such form of behavior as privacy of opinion, then can there be any validity to the cry for the right of privacy of opinion? Obviously not. Then what do the people really mean to do when they raise this cry? It seems that what they are really after is to show that persecution exists because there is difference of opinion. And this is good. Now the air clears. Now, with mythology out of the way,

we can discuss the issues between the persecutor and the persecuted. Let all the opinions be discussed on their merits. Let us see which side is right. We now have a forum of opinion which is as it should be in a democracy. Since psychologically and socially there is no such thing as privacy of opinion let all opinions meet the test of debate. Let us not build our democracy on false foundations.

MARTIN WOLFSON

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Dear Sir,

May I correct a slight misapprehension which has crept into the generally kindly review by Mr. P. H. Phenix of my Eddington Lecture *Creative Aspects of Natural Law*.[1] I should just hate to think that in this lecture, about which I had taken a spot of trouble, I had revealed "basic confusion" and had been "not only inconsistent, but ultimately just as unscientific" as Bergson.

All this arises, I find, because I failed to recognise that mutations are "the only place where quantum transitions might play a role in the mechanism of evolution." I suppose Mr. Phenix intends to raise the old question of possible amplification. Here in Cambridge I had thought that the possibility of amplification to a molar scale was admitted, because so often we see a physicist, weighing perhaps 160 pounds, going 56 miles up to London to read a physical paper, only because his plates have at last supplied a demonstration of some interesting quantum transition. Of course, mutation is also a powerful amplifying mechanism, but it is not the only one.

I am puzzled to think why Mr. Phenix should have raised again the notion that quantum effects are too small to be amplified. Should one not have argued that quantum mechanics could only have been discovered in a world in which such amplification does occur?

R. A. FISHER

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BOOK NOTES

Science: Its Method and Its Philosophy. G. BURNISTON BROWN. New York: W. W. Norton & Co. 1950. 189 pp. $3.50.

The author, Reader in Physics in the University of London, states that the chief aim of his book "is to try to answer clearly three questions, firstly: What is scientific method?, secondly: How has it arisen?, and thirdly: What is a scientific outlook on the Universe

[1] This JOURNAL, Vol. XLVIII (July 5, 1951), pp. 452–453.

in general today?" With much enthusiasm for his subject and in a style lucid and occasionally sparkling with wit, Dr. Brown's discussion of the nature of science is rather loosely organized around these questions. In very sketchy fashion the rise of scientific method is described in chapters on Aristotle, Bacon, and Newton. As is to be expected these days in books of this sort, Aristotle comes off rather badly. He was guilty of laying too great a stress on logic and reason at the expense of experimentation. Bacon, in having more to say about experiment, is nearer to what Dr. Brown regards as the scientific mind. A more penetrating study of the writings of these two men as to what the conditions of valid explanation and knowledge are, and how scientific inquiries are to be formulated, might, I think, indicate that there is a serious question as to just how superior Bacon is to Aristotle in this respect. There are shortcomings on both sides, but Bacon came after Aristotle and seemed to pay little attention to the scientific enterprises of his own day. His failure to appreciate the role of deduction in science, consequent upon his championing of induction and experiment, appears, therefore, less excusable than the opposite tendency exhibited by Aristotle.

An interesting chapter on Newton, interesting on its own account, does not greatly contribute—as it should and was intended to do—to accounting for a more matured conception of science and its method. Dr. Brown points out the well known view of Newton that hypotheses in science are to be avoided whenever possible. But what Newton actually meant by "hypothesis" is not discussed. Failure to show that the eighteenth century conception of "hypothesis" is very different from modern usage is an unfortunate oversight here. That Newton used, as well as indulged in, hypotheses in the modern sense is easily apparent in much of his writings. Thus it is not enlightening when Dr. Brown criticizes Newton for not seeing the importance of hypotheses in scientific procedure. In a chapter on Modern Science, Dr. Brown illustrates, not without success, actual scientific techniques and method in a relatively lengthy example devoted to Wells' *Essay on Dew*. The chapter following this, called Ultra-Modern Science, consists of a brief account of the work of Eddington and Milne. In an attempt to indicate how mathematics has come to play an increasingly important role in physics—indeed sometimes anticipating by formal calculations what is only achieved by experimental means after great difficulty—the author's discussion proves to be far from clear. This is not surprising when, among the ingredients of mathematical physics to which we are treated, we continually bump into others dear

to Eddingtonian epistemologists: inferred structures, pointer-readings, "our ways of thinking which we project onto the Universe," and the like.

Indeed epistemology is the underlying concern of Dr. Brown's study. His emphasis, if not his expressed purpose, is to show that science is the best and only method for attaining reliable knowledge. Approaching science as a method of knowledge is bound to lead into questions as to what knowledge is and how it is to be defined. After a first chapter describing the learning process in animals, it is concluded that abstract thinking requires the use of symbols. *Words,* as one kind of symbol, are the subject of the second chapter. At this point the author introduces us to some of his own epistemological principles, which he regards as significant for understanding science. Briefly, these are "events of consciousness" which are "ultimate events which no conscious person can doubt" (p. 33), and also "they are all we can ever know" (p. 34). Passing from this meager and questionable bit of subjectivism, which he develops from Descartes' *Cogito,* Dr. Brown then sets forth a semantical device which, judging from the frequent references to it throughout the book, he considers to be of great importance. This is the notion of a "symbol-situation." Words, as symbols, have "referents"; to know what a word *means* consists in pointing to its referent and speaking the word. Thus:

> The problem of their [people's] communicating with one another is solved by means of the symbol-situation. They must be present at the same situation (or similar situations): the referent must be indicated by pointing, and, at the same time, the symbol (the word or words) must be spoken so that the two become associated. In this way when people use the same words, they *mean* the same object, or relationship between objects. What other people experience in their consciousness, we do not, of course, ever know, but this knowledge is not necessary to the proper use of language. [P. 37.]

These ideas mark a step backward to Ogden and Richards' *Meaning of Meaning,* the one work cited by the author in this connection. Not all words name (or have "referents"); many names are not names *of* some entity (witness "Zeus" or "Xanthus"), and many names that are names of some object name things that are not accessible to pointing. The heavy reliance on "symbol-situations" is an exaggeration of the importance and utility of the method of ostensive definition. Just how such expressions as "the instantaneous velocity of Mars," "the distance of $\sqrt{2}$ feet," or "the absence of snakes in Ireland," are rendered meaningful by this method we are not told. These difficulties affect the subsequent definitions of "fact," "proposition," and "hypothesis." The meaning and the verification of a proposition come to the same thing for Dr.

Brown, since in each case the symbol-situation serves exactly the same purpose.

> The process of arranging situations in which a person, who understands the proposition in question, can experience such events in his consciousness as he has learned to associate with the proposition, will be called *verification* of the proposition. [P. 38.]

Most persons have learned, or may learn, to associate certain events of consciousness with the proposition "the atom bomb exploded at Hiroshima" or the author's happier "there are trees in Hyde Park." But the mere fact of the occurrence of such associated events of consciousness can hardly be taken as the verification of these propositions; one would expect verification in each case to include some consideration of the actual entities: the bomb, its explosion, and Hiroshima in the first case; the trees or absence of trees in Hyde Park in the second. When events of consciousness are taken as the foundations of empirical knowledge odd things are liable to happen —the world may slip out of the picture altogether.

Dr. Brown, much like those "Aristotelian Scholastics" (i.e., philosophers in general) whom he pictures as ever behind the times and as experts in impeding scientific progress, appears to be unaware of advances made in the last twenty years in logic and the logical investigations of language. He does cite Russell's *Inquiry into Meaning and Truth,* but only in order to dismiss the "intolerable burden" of a hierarchy of languages. Two wise characters, in a dialogue that concludes the book, agree in telling us that the words "true" and "false" can be applied only to statements of fact; that the hierarchy-of-languages idea was devised to define the words "true" and "false," yet all that is needed is "the correct use of language and one symbol-situation" (p. 181). The hierarchy "affair is just a trick to avoid a symbol-situation . . . by making statements about statements" (p. 181). A look at these "symbol-situations" may lead the reader to conclude that, if they can be avoided, the "trick" will have been worth it.

It is a pity that this book, in part so ably written, should largely fail to provide adequate answers to the initial topics for inquiry.

H. S. Thayer

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Reason and Experience. W. H. Walsh. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press; New York, Oxford University Press. 1947. vii, 260 pp. $4.25.

This book is refreshing for being comparatively unaffected by the growing British penchant for linguistic analysis and the philos-

ophy of language, while being nevertheless fairly cautious, subtle, and sophisticated. It presents a good distinction between experience as immediate or pure and as developed, arguing that the concept and analysis of "developed experience" resolves some of the issues between traditional empiricism and rationalism. The point is fundamentally Kantian. In fact, the book is given mainly to an exposition and correction of Kantian epistemology and metaphysics. But, while rejecting the claim that categories and metaphysical propositions about higher orders of reality can be "deduced" from the ordinary lower-order, factual statements, the author does not lean over into the camp of the pragmatic apriorists such as C. I. Lewis or Poincaré. This gives the impression—especially after the final chapter on metaphysics and mysticism—that the author is neither here nor there, or, worse, that he is caught between the devil of Lewis' fluid rationalism and the deep sea of the old Kantian rigid categorism. Where he comes out nobody quite knows, not even the author by one or two of his own admissions. The suspicion grows that his position is fundamentally the eat-your-cake-and-have-it-too sort of the late R. G. Collingwood, which however he also criticizes as a kind of cultural contextualism and therefore too relativistic.

One notices certain possible parallels between the author's manner of speaking and that of the logic-of-language philosophers. Epistemology and metaphysics are acutely treated as meta-sciences or "second order" disciplines not yielding additional factual knowledge in the strict sense but dealing with its "presuppositions." A similar point is made by the positivists, who distinguish a meta- from an object-language, etc. In fact, one wonders if the author might not have avoided some of his double-talk about epistemology and metaphysics as *also* having higher or more basic subject-matter (see his chapter on self-knowledge) had he been more conversant with the tools and techniques of the language analysts. His characterization of the Kantian problem of things-in-themselves also just fails of being really subtle and adequate, through no awareness of the problem of the sense of terms in traditional epistemological use. He remains satisfied with such a conclusion as "*If* certain entities had certain [specifiable?] properties, they would be unknowable *Dinge-an-sich.*"

Perhaps the book's main feature is the treatment of Kant's distinction between the "formal" and the "real" logical functions. Logic (categorial) in its real function appears in synthetic apriori expressions, which formulate fundamental presuppositions and are

prescriptive, not factual, in their significance. In some sense these may be taken as "true," but the author is aware of the problems that arise out of such a use of "true." Intellectual intuitionism is roundly rejected on the strength of this awareness.

The main ideas, suggested in this review, are presented in ten chapters, beginning with "the scope of theory of knowledge" and ending with "experience and metaphysics."

V. C. A.

The Mystery of Being. Volume I. *Reflection and Mystery.* GABRIEL MARCEL. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company. 1950. xiv, 219 pp. $3.75.

This volume contains the first of Marcel's two series of Gifford Lectures. Marcel's pivotal distinction is still that between *problems* and *mysteries:* problems can be decomposed for treatment that will yield publicly communicable results; mysteries resist analysis and communication because the coherence of an individual's total experience is at stake. Although the reflections which pivot around this distinction in these lectures are also already familar to readers of his previous works, they are accorded the more expanded presentation that is appropriate to the lecture platform, and there is considerable interest in their presentation to an English-speaking audience, since they exhibit Marcel's continuing indebtedness to Anglo-Saxon philosophers, Bradley and Royce, whose influences have been quite eclipsed in their own countries.

Marcel seems to me at his best in his subtle management of the drift of his own private musings, but even in these public lectures he displays his characteristic procedure of faltering when he finally grasps an idea, in recognition that language, because it is a means of public communication, cannot be employed without qualification to express the truths of reflection, "which can only be alluded to in a glancing way." He seems to me at his worst when he steps out into the arena of public affairs, where (as this volume illustrates) he is becoming increasingly prone to making, without faltering, unqualified pronouncements about the menace of mass politics and mass culture. Private reflections dedicated to the unfolding of mysteries necessarily enjoin such indiscriminate condemnation of any agency of public action, unless it be a church—a mystical union. There is not, however, anything explicitly theological about the reflections and mysteries of this first volume, and we must wait until the second for Marcel's theology.

R. C.

Volumen Medicinae Paramirum of Theophrastus von Hohenheim called Paracelsus. Translated from the Original German with a Preface by Kurt F. Leidecker. (Supplements to the Bulletin of the History of Medicine, No. 11.) Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1949. vii, 69 pp. $1.75.

This is the first English translation of an early, fragmentary work of Paracelsus that was published posthumously in 1575. As far as I could make out, the translation is clear and careful. One might question the rendering of some technical terms, such as "nature-healers" for *naturales*, or "power" for *ens*. The original text is written in an early High German which is difficult to understand but interesting for its terminology. The work contains some remarkable statements and observations, but on the whole it is obscure, strange, repetitious, and sometimes inconsistent, which may be a result of its state of preservation. Paracelsus' contributions to medicine or his superiority to the science of his time does not appear from this work, in which he criticizes his fellow physicians for their exclusive reliance on natural philosophy, but fails to add to their outlook much else except astrology and alchemy, and some rather crude magic and theology. With reference to this material, some of the claims and statements in the preface make rather curious reading. Clarity is hardly one of Paracelsus' outstanding virtues, and if we credit him with an emphasis on experience and on the method of science, we must include in this experience and in this scientific method a good many elements that would cause surprise to a modern medical scientist. Also the statement that the anti-intellectualism of Paracelsus' attitude is one of the things that make him great as a thinker and physician (p. 1) might easily be questioned. To say that Paracelsus was struggling "with the new thought welling up in him and the recalcitrant, ossified opinions of his day" (p. 2) is a rather fanciful and eulogistic description of the plain fact that a few sentences which happen to appeal to a modern reader are buried in a mass of strange ideas some of which are traditional and others peculiar to Paracelsus. Unfortunately, the new and "original" ideas of a past thinker or scientist do not always coincide with the valid or "modern" elements of his doctrine. And even if they did, such critical distinctions made by a later scientist or historian cannot be attributed, consciously or unconsciously, to a past thinker who was merely concerned with understanding reality as best he could.

Students of Renaissance thought and science will be grateful to Dr. Leidecker for having made available in English one more work of Paracelsus, who certainly is a representative writer of the six-

teenth century. Due to the obscurity of the German text, this version will also be helpful to those who want to peruse the original.

P. O. K.

Il pensiero italiano nell'umanesimo e nel rinascimento. Vol. I: *L'Umanesimo.* GIUSEPPE SAITTA. Bologna: Cesare Zuffi. 1949. ix, 699 pp.

Professor Saitta has been known to students of Renaissance thought through his valuable monograph on Ficino, which appeared in several editions, and through a number of other books and articles. The present book is the first volume of a monumental work that will cover the history of Italian thought in the Renaissance in three volumes. Following a terminology common among Italian historians, this volume dedicated to "Humanism" recounts the history of philosophy during the earlier Renaissance down to the end of the fifteenth century. The volume begins with the predecessors of Petrarch, including Dante, Peter of Abano, and Marsilius of Padua. It devotes one chapter each to Petrarch, Valla, Alberti, Ficino, Pico, and Pontano, and discusses a great number of minor figures in some other more comprehensive chapters. Being the most extensive treatment of this much neglected subject so far, the book will be indispensable to the student of the period. It derives notable value from the fact that it is based throughout on the primary sources, from which ample quotations and summaries are given. Secondary studies are rarely mentioned, but a full bibliography is promised for the third volume. It would be good for purposes of reference if the last volume could also give the basic dates of the authors discussed and of their works, and also corrections for the far too numerous misprints. Occasional slips such as the confusion of Taddeo of Parma with Taddeo of Florence (p. 64) or the attribution to Petrarch of the *De vera sapientia* (p. 88) are less serious in view of the wealth of material covered by Saitta, some of which is quite difficult of access. The general approach of the book reflects definite conceptions of philosophy, of the Renaissance, and of the Humanism of the period. Saitta emphasizes the novelty of Renaissance thought and sees its chief merit in the steady attempt to break away from the supposedly rigid, objective, and transcendentalist patterns of medieval philosophy. He is aware of the objections recently raised against this view, but he disposes of them in a manner that is often more eloquent than conclusive or even consistent. The ideas of the humanists are analyzed and evaluated in a vacuum, without the concrete background of ancient and medieval philosophy and even without the framework of contemporary pro-

fessional and intellectual interests and discussions. Consequently, the prevalence of moral philosophy and its link with literature, so often advocated by the humanists, is taken at its face value, whereas the traditions of Aristotelian logic and natural philosophy, of medicine and mathematics, are treated in a rather scanty and unsatisfactory manner (pp. 425 ff. and 681 ff.), and the development of art theory and of law is almost entirely ignored. Yet aside from such shortcomings which are almost inevitable in a work of such scope, Professor Saitta's volume constitutes an important contribution to the study of Renaissance thought, and it is hoped that he will complete and publish the remaining two volumes in the not too distant future.

P. O. K.

Borderlands of Science. ALFRED STILL. New York: Philosophical Library. 1950. ix, 424 pp. $3.75.

The author claims his book to be an evaluation of the influence on civilization of both science and superstition, and to supply a critical consideration of "borderline" phenomena which scientists rarely investigate. These claims are hardly warranted by the contents. The book is a desultory and partly historical account of various forms of magic and the occult. A number of these beliefs and practices are condemned as baseless, and the role of modern science in extirpating them is noted. However, the author credits as well-founded beliefs in water-dowsing, levitation, poltergeist phenomena, telepathy, clairvoyance, and phenomena of materialization; and his characteristic comment on those who are less credulous is that "none but the ignorant will deny them." The book is in effect a plea for the recognition of "sources of knowledge other than what is conveyed to the mind *via* the recognized bodily senses." Despite its curious anecdotal learning the book is neither amusing nor interesting.

E. N.

NEW BOOKS AND CURRENT JOURNALS

(Books listed here may be reviewed in a later issue)

Allen, E. L.: The Sovereignty of God and the Word of God; a Guide to the Thought of Karl Barth. 45 pp.—Freedom in God; a Guide to the Thought of Nicholas Berdyaev. 43 pp.—Creation and Grace; a Guide to the Thought of Emil Brunner. 46 pp.—The Self and Its Hazards; a Guide to the Thought of Karl Jaspers. 45 pp.—Christian Humanism; a Guide to the Thought of Jacques

Maritain. 46 pp.—Christianity and Society; a Guide to the Thought of Reinhold Niebuhr. 45 pp. New York, Philosophical Library [1951]. 6 vols., $5.00.

Anselmo, San: Proslogion. Texto y traducción. [Traducción castellana de Beatriz Maas. Prólogo de Guillermo Blanco.] La Plata (República Argentina), Ministerio de Educación, Universidad Nacional de La Plata, 1950. 139 pp. (Publicaciones del Instituto de Filosofía. Sección Textos I.)

Blumenfeld, Walter: La antropología filosófica de Martin Buber y la filosofía antropológica; un ensayo. Lima, Tipografía Santa Rosa, S. A., 1951. 150 pp. (Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos. Publicaciones del cuarto centenario. Sociedad Peruana de Filosofía. Colección Plena Luz, Pleno Ser, 6.) (The first two sections of this study consist of an amplified summary of Buber's "What is Man?" which appeared in America and England as the last section of *Between Man and Man*. It is Blumenfeld's general sense that Buber's anthropology is a psychologized existentialism differing considerably from other philosophical versions of existentialism such as Heidegger's. The final section of Blumenfeld's book is a brief and enthusiastic recapitulation of Buber's anthropology in the context of his theory of "confrontation," or "dialogic.")

Buchler, Justus: Toward a General Theory of Human Judgment. New York, Columbia University Press, 1951. 176 pp. $2.75.

Cassirer, Ernst: The Philosophy of the Enlightenment. Translated by Fritz C. A. Koelln and James P. Pettegrove. Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1951. xiii, 366 pp. $6.00.

Contributi del Laboratorio di Psicologia. Serie quattordicesima. Milano, Società Editrice "Vita e Pensiero" [1950]. viii, 387 pp. (Pubblicazioni dell' Università cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Nuova Serie, Vol. XXXV. Articles by A. Gemelli, L. Ancona, A. Terstenjak, A. Perugia, G. Canepa, A. Wirth, and L. Belgeri.)

Dodds, E. R.: The Greeks and the Irrational. Berkeley & Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1951. ix, 327 pp. $5.00. (Sather Classical Lectures, Vol. 25. Contents: Agamemnon's Apology; From Shame-Culture to Guilt-Culture; The Blessings of Madness; Dream-Pattern and Culture-Pattern; The Greek Shamans and the Origin of Puritanism; Rationalism and Reaction in the Classical Age; Plato, the Irrational Soul, and the Inherited Conglomerate; The Fear of Freedom.)

Quine, Willard Van Orman: Mathematical Logic. Revised edition. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1951. xii, 346 pp. $4.75. (Revisions have been introduced into half the pages of the first edition of this book, reviewed in Vol. 37 (1940), though only

in about thirty of these pages are the revisions of major proportions. The major changes have been made primarily to remove the contradiction in the original axiomatization of class theory; and other serious alterations effect a greater economy in the axioms of quantification. Furthermore, a fuller and clearer explanation is now provided of the reasoning which yields Goedel's incompleteness theorem; and a new appendix makes explicit the distinction between theorems formally proved and metatheorems informally established. A new Preface gives a complete list of the major emendations and additions to the first edition.)

Radhakrishnan; Comparative Studies in Philosophy Presented in Honour of His Sixtieth Birthday. New York, Harper & Brothers, [copyright 1950]. 408 pp. $5.00.

ALGEMEEN NEDERLANDS TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR WIJSBEGEERTE EN PSYCHOLOGIE. 43e jrg., afl. 1, Oct. 1950. Nietzsche en het Christendom, by K. F. Proost. De natuurlijke taal en haar rationalisering, by H. J. Pos. Gelijkheid en ongelijkheid, by H. C. J. Duijker. Het oordeel en de intuitionistische wiskunde, by P. G. J. Vredenduin.

FILOSOFÍA Y LETRAS. REVISTA DE LA FACULTAD DE FILOSOFÍA Y LETRAS DE LA UNIVERSIDAD N. DE MÉXICO. Tomo XX, Núm. 39, July-September 1950. Actualidad de Descartes, by José Gaos. Las Pruebas Cartesianas de la Existencia de Dios, by José M. Gallegos Rocafull. Oposición entre la Física y la Metafísica en Descartes, by Elí de Gortari. Descartes y la Política Moderna, by Juan Manuel Terán. La esfera afectiva en el pensamiento cartesiano, by José Luis Curiel y Benfield. Descartes y la Conciencia de América, by Leopoldo Zea. El Cartesianismo en Sor Juana y Sigüenza y Góngora, by Francisco López Cámara. Descartes y los Filósofos Mexicanos modernos del siglo XVIII, by Bernabé Navarro. Descartes en la Filosofía de la Ilustración Mexicana, by Rafael Moreno.

NOTES AND NEWS

In celebration of the 60th birthday of Professor Radhakrishnan a group of scholars has presented him with a volume of comparative studies in philosophy. If testimony were needed to the distinguished character of Radhakrishnan's life and thought, the extraordinary range and excellence of these essays would constitute eloquent testimony. The Editorial Board consists of W. R. Inge, L. P. Jacks, M. Hiriyanna, E. A. Burtt, and P. T. Raju. It is impossible to give such a volume adequate review within the space our Journal has available. It would also be difficult to find anyone besides Radhakrishnan himself who has sufficient range of thought to discuss

intelligently the various essays contributed in his honor. The Editors of the Journal hope that discussion of the themes and possibly of the essays themselves will stimulate discussion in the pages of the Journal from time to time. Meanwhile, for the information of Journal readers, the Editors wish to call attention to the various essays by listing the authors and titles in the order in which they appear in the volume:

E. A. Burtt, *The Problem of a World Philosophy.*
Charles A. Moore, *The Spirit of Western Philosophy.*
A. R. Wadia, *The Philosophical Outlook in India and Europe.*
W. T. Chan, *The Unity of East and West.*
K. J. Spalding, *From Empiricism to Mysticism.*
S. N. Dasgupta, *The Limitations of Science and the Inevitableness of Philosophy and Religion.*
A. C. Bouquet, *The Valuation of the Historical in Eastern and Western Thought.*
M. Hiriyanna, *Art Experience.*
H. D. Bhattacharya, *The Concept of the Spiritual in Eastern and Western Thought.*
A. C. Mukerji, *Reality and Ideality in the Western and the Indian Idealistic Thought.*
G. R. Malkani, *Comparative Study of Consciousness.*
B. K. Mallik, *Radhakrishnan and Indian Civilization.*
H. H. Dubs, *The Development of Altruism in Confucianism* (*The Influence of Universalism on Confucianism*).
Tang Yung-Tung, *On "Ko-Yi," the Earliest Method by Which Indian Buddhism and Chinese Thought Were Synthesized.*
E. S. Brightman, *Personalistic Metaphysics of the Self: Its Distinctive Features.*
G. P. Conger, *A Naturalistic Garland for Radhakrishnan.*
D. M. Datta, *Philosophy of the Body: A New Approach to the Body Problem from Western and Indian Philosophies.*
Humayun Kabir, *Science, Democracy and Islam.*
S. K. Maitra, *The Gita's Conception of Freedom as Compared with That of Kant.*
F. S. C. Northrop, *The Relation Between Eastern and Western Philosophy.*
P. T. Raju, *The Universal in the Western and the Indian Philosophy.*

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